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Matthew A. Benton Peter van Elswyk
Assertion is an act in which speakers commit to a proposition that they
present in a conversation. As such, it has a distinctively normative dimen-
sion. Some assertions seem wrong or inappropriate qua assertions and not
just for reasons of morality or politeness.1 But, as a speech act, it also has a
distinctively linguistic dimension. A speaker typically performs an assertion
by using a declarative sentence.2 Unlike interrogatives, which are used to ask
questions, and imperatives, which are used to issue commands, declaratives
state the way the world is,3 and, as such, their use commits a speaker to the
world being as it is stated to be.
The literature on assertion mostly considers examples of unqualified declar-
atives such as the English sentence (1). But sometimes a speaker uses a qual-
ified declarative like (2).
(1) Jane left the party.
(2) Jane left the party, I think.
That linguistic dierence produces a normative one. Both (1) and (2) present
the proposition that Jane left the party. But the amount of responsibility that
the speaker takes for that proposition is modified in (2). In other words,
qualifying the declarative with I think weakens the speaker’s commitment to
1See Turri 2017.
2Some maintain that assertion can be performed by using subsentential expressions
(Stainton 1995). Others maintain that assertion can be performed by using gestures or
asking rhetorical questions (Schier 1972, Han 1997). However a speaker might token an
assertion, using a declarative is the primary way to hedge an assertion. For that reason, our
focus is exclusively on assertions tokened with declaratives.
3Some call this assertion’s “word-to-world direction of fit”. See Searle 1979, 11–13.
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the world being as it is stated to be.
A speaker’s use of a qualified declarative like (2) is a hedged assertion.4
Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion.5 Linguists often
focus on semantic or syntactic issues related to expressions that can be used
to hedge. Thus they tend to concentrate on semantic or syntactic theorizing
about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals,6 but pay far
less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. They may describe
declaratives like (2) as weakening speaker commitment, but they will not
usually fill out what that involves. By contrast, philosophers have extensively
focused on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required
for proper assertion,7 often extending this framework to illuminate related
assertive speech or interrogatives.8 And yet, they have almost exclusively
considered unqualified declaratives. What happens when a speaker hedges
her assertion is not discussed.
This essay fills the lacuna by considering the linguistic and normative is-
sues side-by-side. We aim to bring some order and clarity to thinking about
hedging to illuminate aspects of interest to both linguists and philosophers.
After canvassing preliminary issues in §1, our discussion will center on three
main questions. In §2, we consider the structural question: what is com-
mitment weakened from? We take up, in §3, the functional question:
what is the best way to understand how a hedge weakens? Finally, we end in
§4 with the taxonomic question: are hedged assertions genuine assertions,
4Sometimes an expression is called a hedge when it makes the propositional content of
an assertion fuzzier in some way. See, for example, Lako 1972. Our use of hedge is limited
to expressions that have uses that weaken speaker commitment.
5The present authors are, of course, exceptions. See Benton 2011, Benton and Turri 2014,
and van Elswyk 2018. Hedging receives little philosophical attention generally. Sorensen
2006 and McCready 2015 are exceptions.
6E.g. Aikhenvald 2004; Simons 2007; Aikhenvald & Dixon 2014; McCready 2015; Mur-
ray 2017 on evidentials; and von Fintel and Gillies 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 on modals.
7See especially Williamson 2000, Ch. 11; Weiner 2005; Lackey 2007; Stanley 2008; Turri
2010b, 2011, 2016a; Brown & Cappelen 2011; Benton 2011, 2016b; Blaauw 2012; Fricker 2012;
Hawthorne 2012; McKinnon 2013, 2015; Goldberg 2015, Gerken 2017, Ch. 7. See also the
chapter on epistemic norms of assertion and action, Gerken and Nedenskov Peterson, this
volume.
8E.g. Turri 2013 on guarantees; Benton & Turri 2014 on predictions; and Whitcomb 2017
on questions.
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another speech act, or what?
1 Preliminaries
We begin with some clarifications and classifications: first concerning asser-
tion as an act type and then to the range of hedges that are available in
English and related languages.
Starting with Frege 1970, assertion is frequently decomposed into a con-
tent and force. Its content is the proposition expressed by the declarative
used to perform an assertion. Its force is the way in which the speaker com-
mits to, or takes responsibility for, that proposition. We will hereafter gloss
assertoric force primarily in terms of speaker commitment. But that should
not be taken as endorsement for a theory—in the style of Peirce 1934, Alston
2000, Brandom 1994, and MacFarlane 2011—that reduces assertoric force to
one of these notions. These concepts are useful for explaining hedging in a
somewhat neutral way.9 In §2 and §3, we will consider a few ways to develop
such talk by connecting it up with extant theories of assertion.
In English, there are several equivalent ways of referring to a speaker’s
assertion that the world is a certain way. For example, one might state or
claim or declare or arm that it is a particular way.10 A standard convention
is to use ‘p’ schematically to refer in an abstract way to assertoric content.
Often a proposition is delineated according to its linguistic roles: it is the
meaning of a declarative sentence, what is denoted by a that-clause like that
Jane left the party, and what is available for reference by anaphoric expressions
like the that in That’s false. We will also assume that a proposition plays these
roles but remain neutral on its metaphysics.
English speakers can qualify their assertive speech in an impressive num-
ber of ways. However, not all qualifications are hedges in the sense we are
9Some will not be amenable to a normative characterization of hedging. Presumably,
those like Pagin 2011 who deny a normative take on assertion will want to resist a normative
characterization of hedged assertion too. A question the reader might consider while reading
is whether a non-normative account of hedging can be developed, especially in light of the
issues we discuss here.
10Though colloquially speakers often also use say to refer mainly to assertions, we shall
reserve this broader term to include utterances made with imperatives and interrogatives as
well.
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concerned with in this paper. An example of a non-hedge qualifier is the
adverb frankly.
(3) Frankly, Jane left the party.
Frankly marks that the assertion is especially direct and to the point. But it
doesn’t weaker the speaker’s commitment to Jane having left the party like
the parenthetical I think in (2) does.
We sort hedges into two groups: attitudinal and evidential.11 Attitu-
dinal hedges weaken commitment by specifying that the speaker has a weak
attitude towards p. A common attitudinal hedge consists of a first-person
subject and attitude verb like think, believe, hope,12 and suspect that has been
inserted in either an initial or parenthetical position. Instead of asserting
outright that Jane left the party, a speaker might add an attitudinal hedge
to (1), which, while retaining the utterance’s assertive character, weakens the
speaker’s commitment.
a. I think that Jane left the party. attitude verb
b. Jane, I believe, left the party.
Or one might append a conditional that expresses uncertainty to similarly
weaken commitment:
c. Jane left the party, if I’m not mistaken. conditional
In contrast, evidential hedges weaken commitment by specifying that the
speaker’s source of evidence for p is one typically regarded as less than fully
reliable.13 They are regularly adverbials like reportedly and epistemic modals
such as perhaps, may(be), might, it’s possible, or there’s a chance.
11By using the term evidential we do not mean to suggest that these expressions are
grammatical evidentials in the sense of Aikhenvald 2004 and others. But, like grammatical
evidentials, evidentials in our sense still specify the speaker’s evidence source.
12See Benton forthcoming for epistemic considerations surrounding hope self-ascriptions.
13Evidential hedges in English parallel grammatical evidentials in many respects. See
McCready 2015, Murray 2017, and citations therein for discussion of related issues.
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d. Apparently Jane left the party. adverbial
e. Jane reportedly left the party.
f. Jane left the party, evidently.
g. Maybe Jane left the party. modal
h. Jane, it’s possible, left the party.
i. Jane left the party, perhaps.
Altogether, examples (a) through (i) illustrate that hedges cross-cut a variety
of linguistics distinctions.
Explaining how these hedges weaken speaker commitment, however, proves
tricky. The first reason was just displayed. These expressions are diverse
enough that the explanation given for how one qualifier can weaken commit-
ment might not work for another. Though epistemic modals and adverbs are
similar, uncertainty conditionals and parenthetically positioned attitudes are
pretty dierent in both syntax and semantics.
The second reason that hedges present a challenge is that they can be
interpreted as contributing to either the content or force of a speech act (van
Elswyk, 2018). Consider Jane probably left the party embedded in the following
discourse as (5).
(4) Who probably left the party?
(5) Jane probably left the party.
(6) That’s false. It is highly improbable that Jane left the party.
For contrast, consider the sentence once again, but embedded within a dif-
ferent discourse as (8).
(7) Who left the party?
(8) Jane probably left the party.
(9) That’s false. Only Jack left the party.
These discourses make a dierence to how probably is interpreted.14 The first
14The careful reader will note that dierence between (5) and (8) also corresponds to
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discourse concerns the probability of an event. That is what the opening ques-
tion inquires about and what forms the basis of disagreement in the response
to the answer. As a result, it is dicult to interpret probably in (5) as hedging.
The proposition presented is about what is probable and the speaker’s com-
mitment to it is not weakened. In contrast, the second discourse is about who
left the party. The question and the response to the answer have nothing to
do with what is probable. Thus probably in (8) can be interpreted as a hedge.
The proposition presented is about Jane leaving the party and the speaker’s
commitment to it is weakened.
In what remains, our focus will be on what hedging does to an assertion at
the level of action. To the best of our knowledge, nobody has oered a general
explanation of how these expressions hedge. Here and there, explanations
have been given for particular expressions.15 But a general explanation that
details what speakers do by hedging remains to be given. So we will take it
for granted that attitudinal and evidential expressions have uses that diminish
speaker commitment or responsibility without canvassing how semantics and
pragmatics interact to make that possible.
2 Structural
Characterizing hedges as expressions that weaken a speaker’s commitment
raises a question: what, exactly, is the speaker weakening her commitment
from? Put dierently, if these expressions serve to hedge, then what, exactly,
a dierence in what proposition is made at-issue by the sentence. That Jane probably left
the party is at-issue in (5). However, that Jane probably left the party is not-at-issue in (8).
Instead, what’s at-issue is that Jane left the party. A complete account of the meaning/force
interface with respect to hedging will need to take this dierence in (not-)at-issue status into
consideration. To not get weighed down by some of the linguistic details not immediately
relevant to assertion, we ignore (not-)at-issueness. See Murray 2017 and van Elswyk 2018 for
discussion.
15Force-modifier views are an example. Huddleston and Pullum (2002, 767) typify this ap-
proach with respect to epistemic modals: “epistemic modality. . . is a matter of the speaker’s
assessment of the truth of the proposition expressed in the residue or the nature of the
speaker’s commitment to its truth.” See Swanson 2011 for discussion of why such views fail.
With respect to grammatical evidentials, Murray 2017 and Faller 2012 oer proposals tai-
lored to evidentials that may be extendible to some English expressions. See McCready 2015
for the most thorough discussion currently available.
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is the speaker hedging against?
Arguably there is a norm with epistemic content which typically governs
unqualified assertions such as (1), where such a norm specifies the required
epistemic position one must be in with respect to a proposition in order prop-
erly to assert it outright. In most discussions, the norm provides a necessary
condition on proper assertion, of the following structure:
One must: assert that p only if one φ (with respect to p).
Philosophers have argued at length over the content of φ, where φ is usually
construed either as an epistemic/doxastic property of the asserter, or as a
property of the asserted p. They also argue over whether there is a compara-
ble norm providing a sucient (epistemic) condition on asserting,16 and even
over whether there is a norm of assertion at all.17 Debate over the content of φ
has appealed mainly to which norm oers the best explanation of a range of
data from linguistic constructions (including Moorean paradoxical conjunc-
tions), conversational patterns from challenges of, or prompts to, assertions,
and judgments of propriety or criticizability. The debate has yielded a strong
case, if not consensus, that knowledge is the required status to replace φ, a
view known as the Knowledge Norm of Assertion:
One must: assert that p only if one knows that p.18
Alternative knowledge norms, similar in spirit but dierent in form, claim that
“an assertion should express knowledge” (Turri 2016a and 2016b), or that “to
assert p with full epistemic propriety or worth requires knowing that p” (Sosa
2010). We shall loosely refer to all such views as “KNA”. Other prominent
candidates for φ in the norm on (epistemically) proper assertion are, respec-
tively, that one must believe; or that one’s evidence make it reasonable for one
to believe (even if one does not); or that one rationally/reasonably believe;
16See Brown 2011; Lackey 2011; Benton 2016a; and Lackey 2016.
17See Cappelen 2011, and his chapter in this volume.
18See the literature cited in fn. 7, as well as earlier work by Unger 1975, Chap. 6, and
Slote 1979 (repr. 2010). For an overview, see Benton 2014, §1. See also Simion and Kelp,
chapter 3 of this volume, on KNA (or its rivals) as the constitutive norm of the speech act
of assertion.
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or that one be certain that p; or that p must be true (see Benton 2014 for
an overview). Naturally, many philosophers dier on whether the content of
the norm itself is context-sensitive,19 or whether it is a defeasible norm whose
conditions of application are context-dependent in some way.
One strand of data that some have thought is best explained by KNA con-
cerns conjunction of hedged utterances with knowledge disavowal or knowl-
edge ascription. Note, first, that when considering each of (1a)–(1i) above,
they each permit adding a conjunct disavowing knowledge of the proposition
that Jane left the party. For example, such additions to (1b), (1f), and (1i)
yield the acceptable conjunctions (note the aptness of contrastive but to con-
join):
(b&¬K) Jane, I believe, left the party, but I don’t know that she did.
(f&¬K) Jane left the party, evidently, but I don’t know whether she did.
(i&¬K) Jane left the party, perhaps, but I don’t know.
Yet by comparison, if one were to add a conjunction claiming knowledge
(even when conjoining with indeed), they will come o as oddly problematic.
For if one claims to know in the second conjunct, it seems bizarre to have
hedged in the first conjunct:
(b&K) ? Jane, I believe, left the party; indeed, I know that she did.
(f&K) ? Jane left the party, evidently; indeed, I know that she did.
(i&K) ? Jane left the party, perhaps; indeed, I know this.
This kind of evidence supports KNA in two ways. On the one hand, the
hedges all seem compatible with disavowing knowledge, where both the hedged
conjunct and the knowledge disavowal serve to explain why the speaker didn’t
19For example, DeRose 2002 argues that the norm is knowledge, but uses this to argue
that (semantic) contextualism about knowledge attributions is true; Turri 2010a agrees that
knowledge is the norm, but argues for (semantic) invariantism about knowledge coupled
with speech act contextualism; and Goldberg 2015 argues that the norm’s content may shift
depending on context (though he thinks that the default standard is knowledge).
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simply unqualifiedly assert that Jane left the party: each implicitly suggests
that knowledge is what would’ve been needed in order to unqualifiedly assert
it. Yet on the other hand, hedging feels out of place when one also claims
knowledge, which is to be expected if one’s having satisfied the norm of as-
sertion absolves one from the need to hedge.
Note as well the datum that attempting to disavow knowledge, conjoined
with an outright declaration like (1), gives us Moore’s paradox:
(1&¬K) # Jane left the party but I don’t know that she did.
And as many have noted, oering a unified explanation of Moorean paradoxi-
cal conjunctions (in either the knowledge version above, or its belief version),
is part of the case for any account of the norm of assertion; indeed, KNA ex-
plains both versions, including the paradoxical nature of using them across
a dialogue.20
A related kind of evidence for KNA involves a pattern found by using
attitudinal expressions in parenthetical position as in (1b). In each case, I
think or I believe can take a fronting main clause position, or parenthetical
position, including sentence-final:
a. Jane left the party, I think.
b. Jane left the party, I believe.
But I know, though it can be used in main clause position, sounds odd and
overly redundant in parenthetical position:
j. ? Jane, I know, left the party.
j. ? Jane left the party, I know.21
Notice then that the sorts of attitudinal expressions which uniformly allow one
20See Benton 2011, §2. Cf. also the relevance of Moorean data from cases of showing and
pedagogical norms: Buckwalter and Turri 2014.
21For more discussion on what parentheticals reveal about assertion, see Benton 2011,
Blauuw 2012, McKinnon & Turri 2013, and van Elswyk 2018.
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to hedge against the primary proposition (that Jane left the party) are also
those which acceptably take on parenthetical position; whereas the attitude
term specifying the KNA’s content, know, sits redundantly in parenthetical
position. Furthermore, know also marks the dierence between acceptable
hedged claims conjoined with self-disavowals of knowledge, and redundantly
strange conjunctions of hedged claims with self-attributions of knowledge. In
other words, these hedging expressions cluster around the notion of knowl-
edge and are applied rightly when distancing oneself from knowing, but ap-
plied wrongly when conveying or claiming knowledge for the speaker. The
best explanation of these patterns is plausibly that, as KNA and closely re-
lated theories have it, knowledge sets the standard for proper permissible
assertion.
3 Functional categorizations
Putting the pieces together from §1 and §2, we say that hedges weaken the
speaker’s commitment because they convey that the speaker does not know
the proposition asserted. But why does a speaker weaken her commitment
by conveying that she does not know?
There are many ways to categorize theories of assertion.22 But one dimen-
sion along which to categorize is whether a theory is representational. A
representational theory characterizes assertion as an act in which the speaker
expresses or represents her epistemic position towards what is asserted.23
Such theories dier along two dimensions: (a) which position or positions are
represented and (b) how that position is represented. Non-representational
theories deny that by asserting, a speaker thereby expresses or represents
anything about her epistemic position. They characterize assertion without
any conditions on the speaker’s epistemic position.
22See Cappelen 2011 and MacFarlane 2011, for example.
23As Black puts it: “In order to use the English language correctly, one has to learn that
to pronounce the sentence ‘Oysters are edible’ in a certain tone of voice is to represent oneself
as knowing, or believing, or at least not disbelieving what is being said. (To write a check
is to represent oneself as having money in the bank to honor the check)” (Black 1952, 31).
Cf. Unger’s view that “if S asserts, states, or declares that p, then S represents it as being the
case that he knows that p” (1975, 252–256).
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Many theories are representational. KNA can be understood as a repre-
sentational theory that identifies knowledge as the position represented and
which accounts for representation as a side eect of there being a norm that
a speaker tacitly follows. Importantly, though, representational theories need
not posit a norm. Davidson 1984, for example, appears to treat position
representation as a primitive feature of assertion.
Examples of non-representational theories include commitment-based the-
ories of assertion. For such theories, assertion is characterized by a speaker
undertaking a commitment to what she asserts. That commitment may be
epistemic in nature. For example, asserting might involve undertaking the
commitment to defend what was asserted by sharing one’s supporting evi-
dence. But undertaking commitment does not essentially involve representa-
tion of an epistemic position. For MacFarlane 2011 and others, being non-
representational is a good-making feature of a commitment-based theory.
Like representational theories, non-representational theories needn’t be nor-
mative either. Pagin 2011, for example, details a non-representational theory
that is non-normative.
Representational theories can explain the function of hedging if they an-
chor speaker commitment or responsibility to what position is represented by
an utterance. Positions vary in strength—knowing p is stronger than merely
thinking or believing it, for example. Speaker commitment and responsibil-
ity plausibly covary with the strength of the position represented. Let’s call
this hypothesis the responsibility–position link or RPL. When utterances
represent the speaker as having a weaker position than what is normally rep-
resented by an unqualified assertion, RPL predicts that she is less responsible
for the proposition’s truth.24
RPL is schematic—it does not specify how responsibility and represented
positions covary or the sense in which responsibility varies in strength.25 As
24A fuller account of RPL can build in a scale of how the scale of commitment, as one
ascends through stronger forms of declarative speech acts, covaries with the credit one earns
by successfully and responsibly using the acts. See Turri (2010a, 84–86), and Benton and
Turri (2014, 1863).
25Usually, responsibility and commitment are understood as binary notions. There are
no partial or degreed intermediary states. The exceptions are worth noting. See Coates and
Swenson (2013) and Nelkin (2016) for discussion of degreed responsibility and Shpall (2016)
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a result, representational theories will explain hedging dierently according
to how they fill in these details of RPL. To illustrate, let’s consider two repre-
sentational theories and begin with KNA.
Williamson’s defense of KNA is articulated in terms of assertion’s consti-
tutive rule or norm, rather than in terms of the general notion of represen-
tation.26 This is because he thinks that KNA subsumes the principle that
assertions represent their speakers as having a particular epistemic position
under more general principles:
In doing anything for which authority is required (for example,
issuing orders), one represents oneself as having the authority to
do it. To have the (epistemic) authority to assert p is to know p.
The [representational] thesis follows. (Williamson 2000, 252, fn.
6)
In other words, unqualifiedly asserting that p requires epistemic authority to
do so and having that authority consists in knowing that p. As a result, un-
qualifiedly asserting that p represents the asserter as knowing that p. Then by
representing oneself as having this authority, one takes on the responsibility of
not misrepresenting one’s authority. In particular, one takes on the respon-
sibility to not misrepresent oneself as have more authority. In Williamson’s
words, “to make an assertion is to confer a responsibility (on oneself) for the
truth of its content; to satisfy the rule of assertion, by having the requisite
knowledge, is to discharge that responsibility, by epistemically ensuring the
truth of the content” (2000, 268–269).
KNA supplemented with RPL can now explain why one incurs less re-
sponsibility with hedged assertion. According to KNA, one should refrain
from unqualified assertion when one takes oneself not to know. The choice
to hedge therefore shows one as being careful enough to refrain from flat-out
assertion, while nevertheless using a declarative to communicate p. Since the
for discussion of gradable commitment. The examples we give shortly rely on a standard
conception of these notions.
26Ancestors of the KNA view (such as Black’s and Unger’s, cited earlier) used the descrip-
tive terminology of assertions representing their speakers’ epistemic positions, rather than the
prescriptive talk of a norm on assertion. For ways of understanding how these relate to each
other, and which may be conceptually prior, see Benton (2012, Chap. 2).
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epistemic authority required for hedged assertion falls short of knowledge,
one does not represent oneself as knowing. Rather, one represents oneself
as having the authority associated with the position indicated. Given RPL,
representing oneself as having this moderate position confers less responsi-
bility on the speaker. The way the speaker is less responsible is that what
she is responsible for—having the authority required—is less demanding.27
It takes more to know p than it does to believe or think p, have p be apparent
or probable on one’s evidence, etc.
Turn next to a representational theory which does not posit a norm of
assertion. An approach which treats what the speaker represents about their
epistemic position as a primitive feature of unqualified assertion, claims that
“to assert is, among other things, to represent oneself as believing what one
asserts” (Davidson 1984, 7–8; cf. Black 1952, 31).28 Insofar as one can repre-
sent inaccurately, one can mislead others. Then not only can one be poorly
positioned with respect to what is represented about oneself, one can also
use that representation to intentionally mislead others. So representing one’s
epistemic position is something for which one can be held responsible. Since
unqualifiedly asserting represents oneself as at least believing what one as-
serts, one thereby represents oneself as having strong enough grounds for
acceptably believing it. But a speaker who opts for hedging their assertion
instead represents something weaker: they at least represent themselves as
less confident, given that they could have, but did not, unqualifiedly assert.
27We are assuming that belief has some norm of rationality or justification which requires
that belief be based on grounds which support or raise the probability of the proposition
believed. But even if there were no such norm, unqualified assertion might still represent
one has having strong enough grounds if assertion represents belief and believing what one
asserts is in practice highly correlated with having strong grounds.
28Note that non-norm representational theories of assertion can still introduce normative
elements. If assertion may be understood partly, if imperfectly, on analogy with the rules of
a game (e.g. Williamson 2000, ch. 11), then even Davidson, who criticizes the analogy as
given by Dummett 1959, acknowledges how this might work: in games, “people who play
usually want to win. Whether they want to win or not, it is a condition of playing that they
represent themselves as wanting to win. . . But perhaps representing oneself as wanting to win
does entail that one can be reproached if it is found that he does not, or isn’t trying to,
win” (Davidson 1984, 5). For concerns about the analogy with games, see Maitra 2011. For
arguments that a non-norm representational theory can capture most of the data that a norm
theory can, see Pagin 2016.
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Typically, being less confident signals that they have less than optimal grounds
for the proposition about which they are less confident. In light of RPL, such
a hedged assertion confers on the speaker less responsibility, which is all the
more appropriate when speakers regard themselves as having less than opti-
mal epistemic grounds for belief.
What about non-representational theories? Some of their defenders try to
account for position representation as a side eect of unqualified assertion.
MacFarlane notes that if assertion consists in undertaking a commitment to
defend p, then “One would not normally undertake a commitment to vin-
dicate entitlement to a proposition one does not believe is true” (2011, 94).
Rescorla (2009) characterizes assertion in terms of how a speaker is supposed
to respond to challenges. Similar to MacFarlane, he suggests that assertion
usually involves the pretense that the speaker believes what is asserted be-
cause assertion presents a proposition as a reason and one normally does
not present a proposition as a reason unless there is some minimal pretense
of believing it. By sneaking in position representation as a side eect, perhaps
non-representationalists can deploy RPL too.
But is dicult to see how non-representationalists could explain why re-
sponsibility and position representation always rise and fall together. For the
views mentioned, position representation is merely a side eect of assertions
performed in normal contexts. In contrast, the amount of speaker commit-
ment or how a speaker is supposed to react if challenged are essential to
assertion as an act. So the two features will detach in non-normal contexts
in virtue of their dierent modal profiles. What is essential to assertion will
subsist but position representation will not.
The non-representationalist might therefore try to account for hedging in
another way. But insofar as position representation is inessential, hedges,
which alter what position is represented, cannot alter what is essential to
assertion. Within the confines of non-representational theories, hedged as-
sertions should be assertions in which the amount of speaker commitment is
unchanged, but the position represented is weaker. But that is not what we
saw §1 and §2. By disclosing what their epistemic position is, speakers can
weaken commitment. We are therefore skeptical that non-representational




Since the start, we have described hedged statements as hedged assertions.
But perhaps this is misleading. Are hedged assertions true assertions? If not,
how should they be understood?
The traditional conception of assertion situates it within a broader family
of speech acts with word-to-world fit that are tokened by using a declarative
sentence. These acts are usually called constatives.30 Verbs for constatives
include insist, conjecture, assure, state, swear, guess, claim, testify, argue, admit,
conclude, remind, predict, confess, report, and hypothesize. A theory of constatives
explains what these acts have in common and in what respect(s) they dier
from each other. As a result, whether hedged assertions are assertions de-
pends on what feature distinguishes assertion from other constatives and if
hedging alters this feature.
In line with representational theories of assertion, one way to account for
the constative family is to maintain that constatives are alike in representing a
speaker as occupying a particular epistemic position, but they dier in which
position is represented. Assertion may, for example, represent the speaker as
knowing whereas weaker constatives like conjecturing or guessing represent
the speaker as occupying an epistemic position that falls short of knowledge
for one reason or another.
Within this taxonomy, hedged assertion is naturally treated as a consta-
tive act other than assertion. By changing what position is represented, the
speech act performed is changed by the hedge as well. Some corroboration
for this perspective is that many of the speech act verbs listed above can be
29One might reply that non-representatonalists do not need to explain hedged assertions
if the latter are not assertions at all. We discuss this taxonomic question in §4. But they are
not so easily o the hook. What we explored in this section was what needs to be true of
assertion given what we have argued is true of hedges as devices for modifying assertions.
So even if hedged assertions are not true assertions, theories of assertion should still clarify
what about assertion hedges modify.
30This is the name used by Austin 1962, Bach and Harnish 1979, Recanati 1987, and
Kissine 2013. Searle and Vanderveken 1985 use assertives to name this family. Kelp 2013
refers to them as informative acts.
15
used parenthetically to hedge.
(10) Jane, I guess, left the party.
In (10), the speaker weakens her commitment by conveying that she is guess-
ing. That is what we should expect if guessing is an act that represents a
position weaker than knowledge.
An account of constatives like the one glossed is necessary for the explana-
tory success of a wide range of theories of assertion. KNA is no exception.
For suppose that acts like (10) are not instances of another constative, but
instances of assertion that a theory must explain. If so, KNA misexplains
them. When a speaker states that her assertion is backed only with the force
of a guess, it is false to identify her act as one where she must know it. A
speaker commits no wrong by being related, as in (10), to a proposition in
the way she says she is. Other theories of assertion that associate assertion
with a specific position would be in similar trouble. If engineered only to ex-
plain unqualified assertions, then if hedged assertions are tokens of assertion,
these views will fail to explain hedged assertions wherein a speaker permis-
sibly occupies a dierent position. So a traditional conception of constatives
is required to clearly demarcate hedged assertions as falling outside the ex-
planatory purview of a theory like KNA.
Not everybody follows tradition. Some representationalists deny that as-
sertion is individuated by a particular epistemic position.31 Depending on
context, what position is represented shifts. Let’s call them variantists about
the epistemic position associated, and contrast them with invariantists.
Variantists face a choice with respect to the constative taxonomy. Either con-
stative acts are no longer distinguished from one another according to what
position is represented. On this approach, assertions can vary in the posi-
tions they represent because a particular position is not essential to assertion
or any other constative. Or, on the other approach, constatives are distin-
guished by position, but assertion is not an act type that is a member of the
constative family. Rather, assertion is regarded as a sub-family of dierent
types covering a range of positions.
31See Levin 2008, Turri 2010a, McKinnon 2015, and Goldberg 2015, for example.
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Goldberg 2015 appears to be a variantist of the first kind. He distinguishes
assertions and guesses as distinct acts, and yet maintains that assertion varies
in the position represented. So what distinguishes assertions and guesses
cannot be the positions they represent. By contrast, McKinnon 2015 is an
instance of the latter approach. She writes that she doesn’t think “there’s
particularly good reason to break [constatives] up into dierent speech acts”
because “The dierences between telling and guaranteeing. . . aren’t like the
dierences between asserting and commanding” (2015, 162). Each constative
is a type of assertion that diers in the degree of commitment.
The variantist’s choice in how to approach constatives predictably impacts
how hedged assertions are to be categorized. For a variantist like McKinnon
2015, hedged assertions count as assertions. Though she does not consider
them outright, they do not dier enough from unqualified assertion to be
disqualified. Interestingly, the norm proposed by McKinnon 2015 can explain
hedged assertions as assertions unlike a norm like KNA. Her proposed norm
is the following:
(SRNA) One may assert that p only if: (i) One has supportive rea-
sons for p, (ii) The relevant conventional and pragmatic elements
of the context are present, and (iii) One asserts that p at least in
part because the assertion that p satisfies (i) and (ii).32
This norm extends to hedged assertions because of the wide variety of epis-
temic positions that count, on McKinnon’s view, as ones in which a speaker
has a supportive reason for p.
32McKinnon 2015, ch. 4; compare also Lackey’s (2007) Reasonable-to-Believe Norm of
assertion, and Gerken’s Warrant-Assertive Speech Act norm (2017, Ch. 7). McKinnon’s
explication of her condition (ii) leaves a lot to be desired (indeed, it is unclear what it would
mean for the conventional and pragmatic elements not to be “present”). On our reading, (ii)
is meant to capture the idea that a context’s conventional and pragmatic elements contribute
(along with one’s epistemic reasons) to whether an assertion in that context is warranted,
making conventional and pragmatic elements “internal to the practice” of assertion (2015,
72–76). But McKinnon claims both that clause (i) concerns only one’s epistemic reasons (p.
64), and that “condition (ii) constrains what counts as satisfying condition (i)” (p. 52 n.
3). It’s a familiar point that practical factors can perhaps aect how strong one’s epistemic
reasons for p must be to permit, in a context, asserting p; but McKinnon’s examples suggest
that pragmatic/conventional factors can permit one to assert that p even when one’s epistemic
reasons support ¬p. But if so, in such cases condition (i)’s epistemic requirement needn’t be
fulfilled, contrary to what SRNA says.
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It is worth pointing out, however, that views like SRNA make it much
harder to explain the systematic conversational patterns like those discussed
in §2. The flexibility gained by covering hedged and unhedged assertions un-
der a single norm necessarily results in fewer explanatory resources to predict
patterns of hedging as weakening a speaker’s commitment. In particular, such
views will sometimes countenance Moorean conjunctions as non-paradoxical,
and will sometimes count one as asserting that Jane left by making utterances
like (1a)-(1i) from §1. If so, such utterances commit their speaker to having
fulfilled the norm, even though they’ve hedged. But if that is right, it is quite
unclear why the speaker would’ve opted to so hedge, or what standard it is
that they are aiming to hedge against.
For a variantist like Goldberg 2015, matters are dierent. Hedged state-
ments like (10) will not count because guesses are not assertions. But what
about statements qualified with parentheticals like I think or epistemic vocab-
ulary like probably? Goldberg does not detail how assertion diers from other
constatives and he cannot rely on a traditional taxonomy that distinguishes
acts through what position is represented. So it is not clear on which side of
the assertion/non-assertion boundary hedged statements fall. Unlike SRNA
and like KNA, however, the success of Goldberg’s norm does hang on which
acts count as assertions. He proposes that the the default position required
for proper assertion is knowledge, but that it can shift up or down,
depend[ing] in part on what would be reasonable for all parties to
believe is mutually believed among them (regarding such things
as the participants’ interests and informational needs, and the
prospects for high-quality information in the domain in question).
(Goldberg 2015, 273–274)
Nevertheless, cases are easily imagined where hedged assertions make trouble
like they did for KNA. In such cases, the hedged assertion will publicize that
the speaker does not occupy the position that is required for proper assertion,
and thus the act of assertion should be improper. And yet, to reiterate an
earlier point, a speaker commits no wrong by being related to a proposition
in the way she says she is.
Goldberg (p.c.) oers a possible reply. Perhaps hedged assertions in con-
texts where the required position is stronger are assertions by courtesy. The
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speaker performing the hedged assertion wants to be cooperative, but she
cannot oer information with the epistemic backing that is needed in the
context. So she hedges as opposed to saying nothing. In turn, conversational
participants recognize her as being cooperative even though she falls short of
the required position. In response, we deny that being cooperative absolves
the speaker of wrongdoing on Goldberg’s account. As a norm-based account,
assertions are predicted to be proper or improper according to whether the
speaker occupies the position required in the context. That the speaker dis-
closes that she is violating the norm makes no dierence to whether she
violates the norm. So it will make no dierence to the mistaken prediction
that the hedged assertion is improper.33 As a parallel, suppose one of us
announces that we were breaking a rule or moral norm while in the act of
breaking it. It would very cooperative (in the communicative sense) to do
that, but this would not get the violator o the hook for breaking the norm.
Though limited in the theories considered, the preceding discussion high-
lights why a theory of assertion must be accompanied by a principled ac-
count of what divides assertions from non-assertions, especially within the
constative family. This methodological question van Elswyk 2018 calls the
demarcation question. Without an answer, we have not settled which acts
need to be explained by a theory of assertion in the first place. For theories
like SRNA, answering the demarcation question does not appear to impact
the range of acts falling under its explanatory purview: for such theories,
both hedged and unhedged assertions can be accounted for as assertions.
But for theories like KNA or Goldberg’s, explanatory success is aected. If
hedged assertions should be counted as assertions, they will be mishandled
because they involve a speaker properly occupying an epistemic position dif-
ferent from what the norm requires.
33Disclosing that the speaker is violating the norm does enable the speaker to contribute
information to the conversation without misrepresenting her position. But Goldberg’s norm
is not a prohibition on misrepresentation, but a requirement that the speaker occupy a par-
ticular position as determined by the context.
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5 Conclusion
After clarifying what hedging involves, we have discussed what a hedge weak-
ens an assertion from (§2), how a hedge weakens commitment (§3), and
where to place hedged assertions within a broader taxonomy of speech acts
(§4). Along the way, a thicket of issues was encountered that a theory of
assertion needs to navigate.
One way through is to adopt KNA and a traditional taxonomy of consta-
tive acts where they are distinguished according to what epistemic position
they are associated with. This approach explains why knowledge is associated
with unhedged assertion and why hedging requires the speaker to specify that
she occupies a position weaker than knowledge. That hedged assertions are
not assertions at all but instances of other constative acts ensures that KNA
cannot misexplain them because it does not need to explain them. But this
way through the thicket might incur costs by proliferating a family of consta-
tives as dense as the number of epistemic positions that a speaker can occupy.
And what of qualified assertions, such as parentheticals, which nevertheless
yield data concerning at-issue content which is better explained by counting
them as assertions?
There may be other ways through this thicket as well. We have given rea-
sons think that commitment-based theories cannot find their way, but broadly
representational theories can. Which way is, on balance, most preferable will
depend on what a theory of assertion is in the business of explaining. Yet the
very issue of what a theory of assertion should explain depends in part on our
prior grasp of which speech intuitively counts as assertions. Most who have
worked on such matters have prioritized one portion of the linguistic data
over others; and very few have taken up the dicult work of giving attention
to the linguistic phenomena of hedging. Though we have not aimed to settle
such matters here, we hope to have at least trimmed the thicket enough to
oer some paths forward.
Seattle Pacic University
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
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